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1Abstract
Governments behavior is expected to be non-neutral in terms of
impacts on both welfare and inequality. In spite of their multivariate
form, a tentative assessment of such inequality impacts can be pro-
vided by using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous-agents
and where wealth and income distribution is determined endogenously.
Using a model capable of exploring the relationship between ﬁscal
policy variables and the endogenous cross-section distribution of in-
come, wealth, consumption and leisure, this paper produces a welfare
and inequality analysis of several equilibriums resulting from diﬀer-
ent combinations of debt levels and of government budget variables.
Moreover, such assessment is based on the empirical reality of the EU
countries.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E17, E60, H60, I30.
Keywords: government budget composition and debt, heterogeneous agent
model, idiosyncratic shock, inequality, welfare.
21 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study how government behaviour - regarding
government size, expenditure composition and ﬁnancing - impinges on welfare
and, in particular, on inequality.
Apparently, government size and expenditure composition is expected to
impinge, both directly and indirectly, on inequality. While transfers, sub-
sidies and progressive tax systems correct for inequality directly, expendi-
ture on the provision of public services such as education, health, or even
R&D may, indirectly, aﬀect inequality via the eﬀects on earning abilities
and growth (see, for instance Ayala et al. (1999), Chu et al. (2000), Smeed-
ing (2000) and Afonso et al. (2008)). Several authors have also studied the
relationship between the quality of public ﬁnances (size, expenditure compo-
sition, governance and legal framework) and growth (see, for a comprehensive
review, Barrios and Schaechter (2008)) which, together with the vast amount
of literature that relates growth with inequality (Tanzi and Chalk (2002),
Scully (2008), Kuznets (1955), Barro (2000), Benabou (1996) and Benabou
(2002), among others) provide intuition on the mechanisms through which
ﬁscal variables may impinge on inequality.
Moreover, deﬁcit ﬁnancing, through taxes or debt issuing is not innocu-
ous. Namely, when Ricardian equivalence fails, government indebtedness
puts upward pressure on the real interest rate, improving relative wealth of
the richer. On the other hand, debt lessens private sector credit constraints
that are especially binding for the poorer, potentially improving welfare in-
equality.
3Therefore, in this paper we built a general equilibrium model with hetero-
geneous agents capable of capturing, theoretically, the relationship between
ﬁscal variables and inequality.1 In particular, we build a close-economy
micro-founded model based on Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), also used
in Floden (2001). This is a dynastic model that includes a continuum
of inﬁnitely-lived rational (optimizing) agents who are hit by idiosyncratic
wage shocks in an incomplete capital market. In order to smooth consump-
tion/leisure, private agents optimally accumulate savings in ”good times”
spending them during ”bad times”. The model also includes a government
subject to a dynamic budget constraint and optimizing ﬁrms endowed with
a neoclassical Cobb-Douglas productive function. Besides allowing for taxes
levied on labour and capital, we further decompose government expenditure
into transfers to private sector, and productive and unproductive spend-
ing. While productive expenditure is included in the production function
and, through this channel, improves output, unproductive spending is utility-
augmenting.
Our aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the channels through
which the presence of government aﬀects household’s behavior and, conse-
quently, overall welfare and inequality. Based on the welfare criterion pre-
sented in Floden (2001), and Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), we conduct
steady state welfare analysis across diﬀerent government sizes, expenditure
1Seminal works using heterogeneous-agent models date from late 80s early 90s and were
developed by Bewley (1983), Imrohoroglu (1989), Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1995) and
Krusell and Smith (1998). For a survey on heterogeneous-agents models, see Storesletten
et al. (2009), Rios-Rull (1995), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and Cagetti and Nardi
(2008). For technical and mathematical aspects see Huggett (1993), Krusell and Smith
(2006), Rios-Rull (1995) and Rios-Rull (1999).
4composition and ﬁnancing. Additionally, we explore the decomposition of
the welfare eﬀects according to the methodology proposed by Floden (2001)
into the consumption/leisure level eﬀect, the uncertainty eﬀect and the in-
equality eﬀect. As for the inequality eﬀect, we further detail the analysis
by computing the usual inequality Gini indexes on wealth (asset holdings),
disposable income, consumption and leisure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe
the model, deﬁne the social (aggregate) welfare criterion and the underlying
welfare decomposition eﬀects. The model is solved for alternative parame-
terization of ﬁscal variables, within a meaningful range of values observed
for the European countries, and the main results are discussed thoroughly
section 3. In section 4 we present the ﬁnal remarks.
2 Model
The model is built from a standard growth model modiﬁed to include a role
for government together with an uninsured idiosyncratic risk and liquidity/
borrowing constraints.
We modify the original models of Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and
Floden (2001) by breaking up the government expenditure into productive
and unproductive. The former is introduced in the utility function and the
latter in the production function. We also use a diﬀerent approach for the
calibration of the idiosyncratic shock.
The model is described below, as composed by three sectors: households,
ﬁrms and the government. Then, we present the main step for steady sate
5computation and, ﬁnally, we use the model to build and decompose the
welfare measure.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents of unit mass who receive after
tax wage payments, ˜ w, after tax interest from savings, r˜ a, and transfers, tr,
from the government. Following Barro (1973), Floden (2001) and Floden
(2003), we consider that besides private consumption, ˜ c , and leisure, l , un-
productive government spending, gu , also contributes to households’ utility
at decreasing returns and according to a parameter ϑ. In each period, agents
are hit by idiosyncratic shocks, et , which determines the productivity level.
Borrowing is allowed only up to a certain limit ˜ b and complete capital market
is ruled out. This implies that agents have to ensure themselves by saving
during ”good times” (˜ at+1 − ˜ at > 0) while, during ”bad times”, savings are
negative (˜ at+1 − ˜ at < 0). Each agent is endowed with one unit of time and
solves the double problem of choosing between labor and leisure, and between
consumption and saving.2













˜ ct + (1 + g)˜ at+1 = ˜ wt(1 − lt)et + (1 + rt)˜ at + trt , ˜ ct ≥ 0, ˜ at ≥ −˜ b (2.2)
2In order to stabilize the model we deﬁne the principal variables as percentage of output
(Y ). Namely we deﬁne: ˜ wt = wt
Yt , ˜ ct = ct
Yt, ˜ at = at
Yt, trt = TRt
Yt , gut = Gut
Yt , and ˜ bt = bt
Yt.




t exp(−(1 − µ)ζ(1 − lt)1+γ)
1 − µ
(2.3)
where µ represents the degree of risk aversion, ζ is constant related to
average labor supply, and 1






The productivity shock et is an idiosyncratic shock that evolves stochas-
tically over time according to the following process: the natural logarithm of
et is represented by an AR(1) process with a serial correlation coeﬃcient ρ
and a standard deviation σ:
log(et) = ρlog(et−1) + t (2.5)
2.2 Firms
The ﬁrms are characterized by a neoclassic production function. Output,
Y , is produced using capital, K , labour, N , and productive government
spending, Gp.




Productive government spending is identiﬁed with the share of public
gross investment on output, in line with Barro (1990) and Auschauer (1989),3
3R. Barro, in a seminal paper (Barro (1990)) incorporates a public sector into a simple,
constant return model of economic growth. The ratio of real public gross investment to
7and enters as an input to private production.
The parameters α and η represent, respectively, the output elasticities
of private capital and productive government expenditure. The production
function exhibits constant returns to scale over private inputs but increasing
returns over all inputs. Assuming competitive markets of goods and inputs,
private factors are paid according to their marginal productivity and output
is exhaustively distributed. Thus:




rt = (1 − τt)(FK(Kt,Nt,Gpt) − δ) (2.8)
where τ is a proportional income tax rate levied on labour and capital
and δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
2.3 Government
The government promotes both productive and unproductive expenditures,
collects taxes and pays lump-sum transfers to households, facing the following
budget constraint in real terms:
gut + gpt + trt + (rt + 1)dt − (1 + g)dt+1 = τt(1 − δkt) (2.9)
where, gpt , k and dt represent respectively, public gross investment (produc-
tive expenditure), private capital and government debt as a percentage of
real GDP, which is assumed to correspond to a ﬂow of services identiﬁed as the measure
of infrastructure services enters directly to the production function.
8output.
2.4 Asset Market Equilibrium
Finally, the expression (2.10) represents the asset market clearing condition
when aggregate asset holdings, a, equal private capital plus public debt. As
before, all variables are expressed as a percentage of output.
at = kt + dt (2.10)
2.5 Solving the model
The consumer’s problem is deﬁned by the maximization of (2.1) subject to
(2.2), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10).
For a given level of d,tr,gu and gp, the recursive competitive equilib-
rium of this economy is characterized by: (i) a tax rate τ, (ii) a vector of
gross prices {r, ˜ w}, (iii) two time invariant-decision rules for asset holdings,
˜ at+1 = α(˜ at,et), and labour supply, (1 − lt) = h(˜ at,et) and (iv) a station-
ary distribution of households across asset holdings and productivity shocks,
λ(˜ a,e), such that (a) decision rules solve the household’s problem, (b) the
government budget constraint is fulﬁlled, (c) r and ˜ w are competitive and





α(˜ at,et)dλ = k(r) + d (2.12)
9The expression
R
α(˜ at,et)dλ represents the demand for assets, whereas
the right hand side stands for the supply of assets (private capital plus gov-
ernment debt) relative to output and expressed as a function of the interest
rate.
The algorithm consists of the following steps: (i) start with an initial
guess for N (aggregate labour supply); (ii) try a ﬁrst guess for interest rate
within some interval [rl,ru]; (iii) given the guesses for N and r, back out the
private capital-to-output ratio, the after-tax wage and the tax rate, using the
government budget constraint and the fact that input markets are perfectly
competitive; (iv) compute time invariant decision rules for the asset holdings,
labour supply and the stationary distribution using the ﬁnite elements tech-
nique as McGrattan (1996, 2003); (v) update interest rate using the bisection
method (Aiyagari (1994)) until asset market clears and, ﬁnally, (vi) update
aggregate labour supply, N until labour market clears.
2.6 Social welfare computation
The utilitarian social welfare, U, is deﬁned as the solution of (2.1) across all








The utilitarian social welfare increases with consumption, leisure or govern-
ment unproductive expenditure. Since the utility function is concave, the
4The solution is represented by a sequence of consumption and leisure to eternity
{ct,lt}∞
t=0.
10utilitarian social welfare is inﬂuenced by the distribution, and then, higher
inequality or uncertainty will reduce welfare.
In order to measure the impact of policy in welfare across steady states,
we decompose, following Floden (2001), the total welfare into three particular
eﬀects: the insurance level eﬀect, the inequality eﬀect and the consumption
eﬀect.
Consider a policy change that moves an economy from steady-state A to
steady-state B. The total welfare gain is measured as a percentage of life-
time consumption that households gain (or lose) in moving instantly from





























The insurance eﬀect explores the time dimension of the utility function con-
cavity. In order to remove the inequality eﬀect, we compare the average
level of consumption, C, and leisure, L, with the average of the certainty-










where the certainty-equivalent consumption and leisure bundle , c and l,
5The certainty-equivalent levels of consumption c and leisure l represent the constant
levels of consumption and leisure that would ensure an utility level equivalent to that
expected under the uncertain utility ﬂows in the future.









We deﬁne punc as the cost of uncertainty and calculate it from the diﬀer-
ence (in percent of life-time consumption) between the utility evaluated at


















If uncertainty increases, C decreases and moves away from C; therefore, punc
increases. The insurance welfare eﬀect will be negative (wunc < 0) and, thus,
a rise in uncertainty impacts negatively on global welfare.
2.6.2 Inequality eﬀect
The inequality eﬀect explores the space dimension of the utility function
concavity. We now use the certainty-equivalence variables to remove uncer-
tainty from welfare. We deﬁne the cost of inequality, pine, as the diﬀerence
(in percent of life-time consumption) between the utility of average certainty-
6As pointed in Floden (2001) the last equation does not deﬁne a unique combination
of c and l. To get an unique combination, we opt to set leisure at the level chosen by
each household at t = 0. A second option was to use the average leisure level of the whole
economy. The results are very similar and don’t aﬀect the conclusions.
12equivalence of consumption and leisure, and the utility evaluated at the cor-
responding certainty-equivalence levels. Then pine is equivalent to the level of
consumption that people are willing to give up in order to promote an equal
distribution of consumption and leisure across individuals, maintaining the









As before, wine represents the inequality eﬀect associated with moving







A more unequal welfare distribution will decrease the right side of (2.18) and
raises pine. Thus a rise in inequality impacts negatively on global welfare
(wine < 0). We complement wine with the usual Gini coeﬃcients for wealth
and disposable income. Naturally, such indexes will not always match wine
in which composition reﬂects all sources of utility (consumption, leisure and
unproductive government expenditure).
Instead of the simple formula presented in Floden (2001) our decompo-
sition of wu into wlev,wunc and wine (due to the inclusion of unproductive
expenditures in the utility function) yields a much more complex formula.7
7The formula is available upon request.
132.6.3 Consumption eﬀect




CA − 1 (2.20)
where, ˆ CB, is the leisure-compensated consumption in economy B: the
change in consumption necessary to reach the level of utility in B when LA
and GA


















The model presented above follows closely Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)
and Floden (2001).
Preferences: µ, is set at 1.5, a value of standard use in the literature. For
γ we follow, among others, Floden (2001) and set it to 2 which is equivalent to
a wage elasticity of labour supply equal to 0.5. The parameter ζ determines
the fraction of time devoted to labour and is set in order to match an average
labour supply of around 0.3 (ζ = 9.145). Finally, for the preferences towards
public goods and services relative to private goods, the baseline calibration
sets ϑ = 0.1.8
8It is not usual to ﬁnd gu in utility in the literature. Moreover, when the utility function
includes collective consumption, there is no homogeneous value for the calibration. For us,
the use of values larger than ϑ = 0.1 is not compatible with meaningful values for policy
variables observed in EU and most of developed countries.
14Technology: the production function is inspired in Barro (1990) to incor-
porate productive government spending. For our baseline model we follow
Auschauer (1989) and set η = 0.3. For the capital share, α = 0.3 (Aiyagari
and McGrattan (1998) and Floden (2001)).
Discount factor and interest rate : according to our model, r = α
k −δ.
We set δ = 7.5% as in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). The variable k
represents the capital-to-output ratio and the steady-state value is calibrated
as to match the average value of the capital to output ratio of the EU15
countries (1990-2008).9 Thus, with a period of one year, the steady-state
value for the real interest rate yields 2.8%. We calibrate the discount factor
in order to reach an equilibrium with this real interest rate level, which
implies β = 0.981.
Government: the government is characterized by a set of ﬁscal indicators
{d,tr,gu,gp}. Using the AMECO database, we calibrate policy variables with
the average values (1990-2008) of the EU15. Speciﬁc values will be released
during simulations in section 3.
The idiosyncratic shock: following the procedure of Tauchen (1986), the
idiosyncratic shock is described as a ﬁrst order Markov chain speciﬁcation
with seven states to match a ﬁrst order autoregressive representation (Aiya-
gari (1994)).
Aiyagari (1994), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), and Floden (2001) base
their values of ρ and σ (the serial correlation coeﬃcient and the coeﬃcient of
9Source: AMECO database, k = 2.9 for EU15.
15variation) on empirical data for earnings and annual hours worked. Due to
unavailable data on the EU15 average, we follow a diﬀerent procedure. As
in Rios-Rull et al. (2003) we set both parameters as to match the existent
inequality in the EU15. Speciﬁcally, we use the income Gini index as a
reference. According to the AMECO database (EU15 between 1990 and
2008) the income Gini index varies between 0.26 and 0.34. Thus we set
ρ = 0.8 and σ = 0.27 which leads to a disposable income Gini index of
around 0.28.
3 Optimal Government Expenditure and Fi-
nancing
This section gives insight on optimal government size and ﬁnancing. In par-
ticular we want to assess how ﬁscal policy variables {gu,gp,tr,d} impinge on
welfare as well as how they aﬀect inequality. In order to make such assess-
ment, we produce a continuum of steady state equilibria that are character-
ized by diﬀerent government behaviours. First, we consider diﬀerent endow-
ments on each of the ﬁscal policy variables, allowing for a corresponding tax
adjustment. Second, we evaluate the impacts of a changing composition on
policy variables regarding ﬁscal policy inter-temporal structure: how do wel-
fare and inequality indicators behave in face of more expenditure, ﬁnanced
through current taxes, relative to higher public debt? Third, for a given
debt-to-output ratio, we study how a changing composition of government
expenditure (intra-temporal substitution, for a ﬁxed tax burden) impinges
16on welfare and inequality. Thus we ﬁnd the optimal government composi-
tion of ﬁscal variables (both inter and intra-temporal) while assessing on how
government expenditure and ﬁnancing impacts on welfare inequality, as well
as on several complementary inequality measures.
3.1 Individual impact of ﬁscal variables
In order to better understand the channels through which ﬁscal variables
aﬀect welfare and inequality, we calculate a sequence of steady state equi-
libria considering alternative values for a single variable, leaving the others
unchanged. Throughout this exercises, taxes adjust to fulﬁll the government
budget constraint and thus, also impact on welfare. However tax impacts on
inequality are only indirect, namely through their eﬀect on labour supply, as
they are not progressive in the model.
3.1.1 Public debt: d
As a ﬁrst exercise we propose to assess how debt impinges on welfare and
inequality. In order to do that, we calculate the steady state equilibria for
a continuum of debt-to-output ratios between 0 and 100%. We further de-
compose the welfare measure into the three eﬀects (level, insurance and in-
equality). We also set other ﬁscal instrument, besides taxes, at tr = 7.5%
and gu +gp = 20%. The choice is somehow arbitrary, but nevertheless, these
values are very close to the optimal levels obtained in the next exercises, and
they are compatible with average values for the EU countries.
In a standard deterministic representative agent growth model, the im-
17pact of government debt on welfare depends on the tax regime. With lump-
sum tax, debt is neutral, while with distorting tax, debt helps to smooth tax
burden over time (Barro (1974, 1979); Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)). In a
heterogeneous-agent framework, government debt has an additional impact
on welfare by providing further means to smooth consumption. By issuing
debt, the government lessens agent’s borrowing constraint (Aiyagari and Mc-
Grattan (1998)). Furthermore larger debt puts upward pressure on interest
rates, making assets more proﬁtable to hold and, thus, households become
better insured against earning ﬂuctuations. Naturally, higher debt (and in-
terest rates) has also negative impacts on welfare by implying higher taxes
and crowding-out private investment.
Figure 1 depicts the welfare assessment for diﬀerent debt-to-output ratios,
as well as its decomposition into level (wlevel), insurance (wunc) and inequality
(wine) eﬀects. As debt-to-output ratio increases, insurance increases (line
with circles). For higher debt levels, the consumer’s borrowing constraint
is looser (Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) show analytically why) and the
interest rate is higher. Moreover, saving becomes more proﬁtable and the
insurance capacity improves. As for the welfare-level eﬀect, higher debt-to-
output ratios impinge negatively on consumption which rules out the over-
accumulation of private capital beyond the golden rule level.10 Finally the
inequality eﬀects (lines with crosses) are negative due to the interest rate
increase which beneﬁts more the asset owners relative to lower wealth classes,
leading to a more unequal welfare distribution across households. Combining
10Except for the nonexistence of over-accumulation of private capital all the ﬁndings are
in line with Floden (2001).
18the three eﬀects, the global welfare is hump shaped and peaks around d =
50%.
Figure 2 provides information on how additional inequality measures
change across debt-to-output ratios. The inequality measures reﬂect mostly
the debt-to-output ratio eﬀects on the interest rate and on the labour supply.
By lessening credit constraints, debt reduces the layer of households with zero
or negative asset position, improving the wealth distribution (the wealth Gini
index decreases). According to Figure 2, the disposable income Gini index
also moves negatively with debt. As debt increases, tax rate goes up aﬀecting
the after-tax wage. The substitution eﬀect dominates in the labour market,
but the elasticity of labour supply is higher among the wealthier who tend
to switch more labour for leisure than the poorer. Therefore, the income
Gini index decreases. Naturally, this eﬀect in labour supply induces a more
unequal distribution of leisure. Note ﬁnally that as interest rate rises with
debt-to-output ratio, capital earnings contributes to a more unequal income
distribution since wealthier households hold relatively more assets (despite
the improved asset distribution). In balance, labour supply eﬀect dominates
and income dispersion improves with debt.
In spite of the improvement of income and asset holding distribution, we
have just seen that the overall inequality eﬀect contributes negatively to wel-
fare (Figure 1 above). This example shows how diﬃcult it may be to ﬁnd
adequate deﬁnitions and measures of inequality. A theoretical model, with
a welfare function completely deﬁned, enables a comprehensive identiﬁca-
tion of the three relevant sources of welfare inequality: consumption, leisure
and unproductive expenditures (collective consumption):{c,l,gu}. Collective
19consumption is not relevant because it is deﬁned as a fraction of output dis-
tributed equally across households. As debt increases, consumption becomes
more equally distributed in line with the disposable income and the asset
holding. However, leisure distribution becomes more unequal, as a coun-
terpart of the stronger fall of labour supply by the wealthier. In balance,
the increase in leisure inequality dominates over improved distribution of
consumption for higher debt-to-output ratios.
3.1.2 Social Transfers: tr
Consider now the impact of transfers, assuming constant debt of 50% and
gu+gp = 20%. Figure 3 shows how insurance (line with circles), consumption
level (line with asterisk) and inequality (line with crosses) aﬀect welfare across
diﬀerent transfer-to-output ratios. It is clear that larger transfer-to-output
ratios impinge negatively on welfare level, reﬂecting lower labor supply and
savings. Insurance and inequality eﬀects are positive. Larger social transfers
mean that, independent of the idiosyncratic shock, a larger portion of income
is granted, and, thus uncertainty is lower. Lump-sum social transfers beneﬁt
all population, but the poorest beneﬁt proportionally more because they
hold a lower amount of assets. Therefore, the inequality eﬀect on welfare is
positive with transfers. Combining the three eﬀects, total welfare measure
maximizes for tr = 8%.
For a closer inspection on the impacts on inequality, Figure 4 show how
the Gini coeﬃcients on asset holdings, disposable income, consumption and
leisure, change across transfer-to-output ratios. Concerning wealth distribu-
tion, the Gini index is larger (higher inequality) for larger transfer-to-output
20ratios. Transfers, by reducing the need for insurance, aﬀect especially asset
holdings of the poorer: the fraction of households with negative or no wealth
increases and the asset distribution becomes ﬂatter. The eﬀects on dispos-
able income inequality are direct: transfers represent a lump sum element
that make disposable income more homogeneous across households.
As stated before, overall inequality eﬀect is positive while wealth and
income inequality move in opposite ways with transfers. Apparently, dispos-
able income eﬀect on inequality dominates to reduce consumption inequality
(Figure 4). In contrast to debt, leisure inequality decreases the larger the
transfer-to-output ratio is; as transfers rise, the poorer face stronger disin-
centive to work, increasing leisure relatively to the wealthier. Concerning the
two main sources of welfare inequality, both consumption and leisure distri-
bution improves with larger transfers, making overall inequality (Figure 3)
welfare enhancing.
3.1.3 Productive and unproductive expenditures: gp, gu
Unproductive spending, gu aﬀects welfare directly as it delivers utility for
private agents (e.g. public health education or law and order). In the fol-
lowing exercise, we set d = 50%, tr = 7.5% and gp = 1.5%. As before, we
calculate the steady state equilibria for a continuum of unproductive govern-
ment expenditure in percentage of output (between 8.5% and 18.5%).
Figure 5 plots total welfare as well as its components against government
unproductive spending as percentage of output. The welfare level eﬀect is
positive for small increments of government expenditures. This means that,
21as explained in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Floden (2001), there
is an over-accumulation of capital beyond the gold rule level which maxi-
mizes consumption. From about 10% of government spending, the distortion
eﬀect on labour and saving choices11 dominates and the level eﬀect turns
negative. As for inequality and uncertainty, they both have a slight positive
eﬀect on welfare as government spending increases. Government delivers a
constant (certain) ﬂow of utility to households, reducing uncertainty. As
for inequality, the mechanism is also direct - a larger endowment of public
services is distributed evenly across households, reducing disparity in wel-
fare. Combining the three eﬀects, the global welfare reaches a maximum for
a government unproductive expenditure of 12%. The importance of both
these eﬀects depends crucially on the value for the utility parameter con-
cerning the unproductive government expenditure ϑ = 0.1. Notice that the
model is not capturing positive indirect eﬀects in welfare and inequality from
public services (namely those on growth resulting for instance from human
capital accumulation) nor those aﬀecting the idiosyncratic shock.
Figure 6 illustrates several inequality measures for diﬀerent values of un-
productive spending (as % of output). As with debt, disposable income and
wealth (and thus, consumption) become more evenly distributed. The de-
crease of the wealth Gini coeﬃcient reveals that asset selling aﬀects more the
wealthier, who are in a more favorable condition to smooth consumption and
leisure.
The disposable income Gini index decreases because of the dominance of
the labour supply elasticity eﬀect. Figure 7 plots labour supply across asset
11due to the increased tax needs to ﬁnance the government expenditure increment.
22holdings for the two extreme values of government expenditures (gu = 8.5%
and gu = 18.5%). For larger values of gu, after-tax wage becomes smaller and
the wealthier will work less relative to the poorer. Thus, labour income be-
comes more equally distributed. Naturally, the opposite occurs with leisure in
which distribution becomes less compressed (i.e. more unequally distributed)
-see Figure 6 . Unlike debt, consumption inequality positive eﬀects slightly
dominate over leisure and overall inequality has a modest positive impact on
welfare as gu rises.
The same exercise with the productive expenditure gp reveals a positive
level eﬀect on welfare due to the improved productivity but with no impact
on inequality. Table 1 resumes the individual eﬀects of the policy variables
on each inequality measures.
3.2 Optimal combination of social transfer, govern-
ment spending and debt
In this context, a ﬁrst question arises: is the (inter-temporal) composition
of government expenditure ﬁnancing meaningful to welfare and inequality?
As government expenditure increases, does improving welfare precludes more
tax-ﬁnanced government expenditure or is public debt accumulation better?
In the present section our exercises consist of assessing the optimal combina-
tion of debt, taxes and transfer for diﬀerent levels of government spending.
In the present exercise we consider three government expenditure sizes:
large, {gu + gp = 0.20}, medium, {gu + gp = 0.175} and small, {gu + gp =
0.15}, values taken among those observed for some groups of EU countries.
23For each government expenditure size we compute steady states across a
continuum of debt levels [0,1.5] and transfer levels [0,0.15] (all values are
expressed in percent of output). Then we repeat the simulation under the
extreme scenario (ϑ = 0) as in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Floden
(2001). Table 2 sums up, for each scenario, the optimal debt and transfer
combination, the corresponding welfare value and the inequality indicators.
Irrespectively of ϑ, as government expenditure size increases, the opti-
mal level of public debt increases while social transfers remain rather sta-
ble. The optimal level of debt for the small, medium and large government
expenditure-sizes is of 0%, 10% and 30%, respectively, when gu is utility
enhancing (otherwise, the values are higher, of 20%, 40% and 50%, respec-
tively). The simulation shows that, for larger government expenditure, ﬁ-
nancing should be done, at least partially, through higher indebtedness.
The optimal public debt level rises with government expenditure-size to
compensate for the utility loss associated with larger public spending. Trans-
fers end up being less elastic with expenditure size than debt because the
latter implies smaller tax distortions (lower tax eﬀort). As such, government
expenditure impinges negatively on welfare inequality. The insurance eﬀect is
welfare enhancing (due to the increased level of interest rate) while the level
eﬀect depresses welfare. Tax and interest rates raise as government expen-
diture and debt increase. Inequality measures reﬂect mostly the debt eﬀect.
According to the results in Table 2, wealth, income and consumption Gini
coeﬃcients decrease and the leisure Gini index increases.12 Unproductive
12The exception concerns the income Gini index with ϑ = 0 and gu + gp = 17.50%: it
rises lightly because transfers decrease from 9 to 8%.
24government expenditure distorts incentives signiﬁcantly, especially beyond a
certain value.13 Debt, in which distortion eﬀect is much smaller, can accom-
modate part of government spending increase. The tax increase necessary to
ﬁnance the growing expenditure aﬀects labour and saving decisions. House-
holds will supply less labour, specially the upper wealth classes, compressing
the income distribution and pushing up the leisure Gini coeﬃcient.
3.3 Optimal composition of global government spend-
ing
We have concluded that the larger the size of government, the higher the
optimal debt-to-output ratio is. However, this is achieved at higher inequal-
ity and welfare costs. A ﬁnal exercise consists in assessing the welfare and
inequality impact of intra-temporal composition of government expenditure
(gu, gp and tr). In the following exercises, inter-temporal government ﬁnanc-
ing is given and, thus, we set aside the impacts on taxes and the correspond-
ing second-order eﬀects on leisure and income inequality operating through
the labour supply channel. For a given debt level (for all exercises we set
a public debt output ratio of 50%), optimal or not, one should expect ex-
penditure composition to aﬀect welfare and, in particular, welfare inequality.
Moreover we consider diﬀerent government sizes as measured by total spend-
ing:14 a large-size government with G = 30% (of output); a medium-size
government with G = 25% and a small-size government with G = 20%.
13About 12% with a debt output ratio of 50% and a transfer output ratio of 7.5% as we
saw, above, in ﬁgure 5.
14G = gu + gp + tr.
253.3.1 Unproductive expenditure(gu) versus social transfers (tr)
Given a ceiling for total expenditure, for each government size, we ﬁrst sub-
stitute unproductive expenditure by social transfer while productive expen-
diture remains constant (gp = 1.5%). Figure 8 and Table 3 illustrate the
welfare eﬀects and several inequality indexes as the weight of transfer in
total expenditure rises, for the medium-size government (G = 25%). The
patterns are similar for the other government sizes.
The global welfare, which reﬂects the combination of the three eﬀects
described above, reaches a maximum with a speciﬁc combination of social
transfers and unproductive expenditure (see table 4 for the optimal values).
As we substitute unproductive expenditure by transfers, the welfare decom-
position shows slight positive eﬀects on equality and insurance. The hump-
shaped welfare curve is mostly determined by the welfare level eﬀect. For
lower unproductive-expenditure (gu), the household compensates with higher
private consumption in order to keep the same level of utility. Thus, the level
eﬀect is positive and increasing. However, for a certain high level of transfers,
the disincentive to work induced by higher transfers dominates and the level
eﬀect decreases (agents work and save less depressing the output).
Table 3 shows that the welfare inequality eﬀect is positive and that it
increases steadily as unproductive expenditure is substituted by transfers.
Such inequality impact reﬂects the dominant eﬀect of social transfers (see
Table 1). Concerning the other inequality measures, Table 3 also shows that
higher social transfers with less unproductive expenditure leads to higher
wealth inequality (agent save less globally, especially the poorer). The dis-
26posable income and consumption inequality decrease due to the direct eﬀect
of social transfers. The fall in the leisure Gini index indicates that the reduc-
tion in labour supply induced by higher transfer payments aﬀects especially
the poorest.
Table 4 shows the optimal combination of unproductive expenditure with
social transfers for diﬀerent government sizes and compares the respective
steady state equilibrium. The optimal levels of gu are rather stable across
government sizes while the level and weight of transfers changes signiﬁcantly
with government size. For the large-size government, transfers represent
50% of total expenditure while in small-size governments represents 30%.
This means that the marginal rate of substitution of government expendi-
ture for social transfer rises with the size of government. Moreover, the
model points to a minimum unproductive expenditure-to-output ratio that
households wish to keep.
Small-size governments exhibit higher global welfare performance, strongly
determined by welfare level eﬀects. Decreasing unproductive expenditure
delivers signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains and, consequently, positive welfare level
eﬀects due to the decrease of the optimal levels of gu and tr. However,
lower government-size has a negative impact on the insurance and inequality
welfare eﬀects especially due to the lower optimal transfer levels.
Concerning the inequality measures, we have already seen that the welfare
distribution is inversely related to government size. Gini indexes presented
in Table 4 support this result. With the exception of the wealth Gini in-
dex, all the remaining measures increase with smaller-size government. The
increase of inequality in disposable income and consumption reﬂects the pos-
27itive relation between transfer intensity and government-size. As for leisure
distribution, the answer to the increased inequality must be found in the
labour market. The transfer reduction aﬀects strongly the disposable income
of the poorer (as they receive lower capital earnings), which, by enhancing
the positive response of labour supply, increases the leisure Gini index for
small government sizes.
3.3.2 Social Transfers (tr) versus productive expenditure (gp)
In the following exercise we test several combinations of social transfers and
productive expenditures, while the level of unproductive spending is kept
constant (gu = 0.15) across government sizes. Table 5 and Figure 9a exhibit
the welfare and inequality measures for diﬀerent combinations of {gp,tr} for
η = 0.3 and large-size government (G = 30%). Patterns are similar for other
government dimensions.
Under the baseline parameterization, welfare increases permanently until
social transfers are exhausted. From Figure 9a we can see that the level
eﬀect dominates through the productivity eﬀect. Although it is not clear
in the graph on Figure 9a, simulations show a negative eﬀect on the insur-
ance and inequality components of welfare, caused respectively by the fall
of interest rate and by the transfers reduction. As transfers are substituted
by public investment, households will work harder, save more and consume
more (as output increases). Given that productive expenditure does not af-
fect the distribution, the changes occurring in the inequality measures derive
from the reduction of social transfers. Low transfer levels induce households,
specially the poorer, to engage in larger precautionary savings, decreasing
28wealth Gini index. On the other hand, all other inequality measures worsen
because transfer reduction impinges directly on income and consumption dis-
tribution. Moreover, transfers reduction increases labour supply, especially
for the poorer and, thus, leisure Gini index increases.
However, results depend crucially on the output elasticity relative to pro-
ductive expenditure. Figure 9b takes η = 0.03 for the large-size government-
case. In this case, the productivity eﬀect is much weaker, and the welfare level
gain is not suﬃciently high to compensate for the negative eﬀect on insurance
and inequality. Welfare is maximized with a combination of gp = 3.50% and
tr = 11.50% (Table 6). The dynamics are similar except for the fact that
the eﬃciency eﬀect of the productive expenditures is not as high as in the
baseline scenario. Above a certain level, productivity gains can no longer
compensate for the utility loss due to lower transfers. As predictable, all
inequality measures present the same patterns regardless the productivity of
government expenditure (η).
Table 6 shows the optimal combination of productive expenditure with
social transfers for diﬀerent government sizes and resumes the main welfare
and inequality measures for the (meaningful) lower level of output elasticity
relative to productive expenditure (η = 0.03). As government-size decreases,
both optimal levels of productive expenditure and social transfers decrease.
But clearly, the optimal level of social transfer plunges deeper while the
optimal level of productive expenditure declines marginally. The share of
productive expenditure on total expenditure moves increases with the lower
government-size, from 11.67% for G = 30% to 15.50% for G = 20%. As for
social transfer the share is 38.33% and 9.5%, respectively for the large and
29small sizes government. The welfare decomposition shows, for lower govern-
ment sizes, a positive level eﬀect against a negative insurance and inequality
eﬀect (both explained by the substitution of transfers for productive expen-
diture). The global welfare is maximized with the small-size government
especially due to the welfare level eﬀect. Decreasing the global government
spending with social transfers releases the tax burden and simultaneously
stimulates the labour supply, delivering signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains.
As for the other inequality measures, Table 6 shows that the wealth Gini
index decreases with lower government sizes because, with low transfers, the
poor must increase their savings. The other Gini indexes reﬂect mostly the
eﬀect of the reduction of social transfers which aﬀect directly the disposable
income and consumption distribution. The increase in the leisure Gini index
reﬂects a positive eﬀect on labour supply, more expressive for the poorer.
3.3.3 Unproductive (gu) versus productive expenditure (gp)
In order to assess the degree of substitution between gu and gp, we set tr to
7.5% and compute equilibria for a series of combinations of {gu,gp}. Figure
10 plots the welfare decomposition across productive expenditures, gp, for
G = 20%. The patterns are similar for the other government sizes. Exchang-
ing unproductive for productive expenditure induces a productivity welfare
eﬀect acting through the production function. The other two components
of welfare decomposition are completely neutral. Note that since productive
and unproductive expenditures are equally distributed across the population,
the former through the production function and the latter through the utility
function, they are perfect substitutes regarding inequality. Table 10 shows,
30for G = 20%, that the impact of substituting gu for gp is always welfare
enhancing and has no impact on the inequality measures. The same applies
for the remaining government sizes (medium and large).
4 Conclusion
Using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, calibrated ac-
cording to the EU empirical reality, we exemplify the channels through which
debt, social transfers, collective consumption and public gross investment af-
fect social welfare. Moreover, we decompose the impact on social welfare
into welfare-level, welfare-insurance and welfare-inequality eﬀects. We com-
plement the welfare-inequality eﬀect by calculating Gini indexes on several
standard inequality variables such as wealth, disposable income, consumption
and leisure.
On one hand, we ﬁnd that a rise in unproductive expenditure and in
transfers improve welfare up until a certain upper bound. Direct eﬀects on
utility and disposable income, respectively, impinge positively on inequal-
ity and uncertainty, while indirect tax eﬀects have negative impacts on the
welfare level due to strong disincentives on labour supply. Productive ex-
penditures induce a dominant positive welfare-level eﬀect with no impact on
inequality. On the other hand, debt delivers positive welfare-insurance eﬀects
through interest rate incentives on savings, but the dominance of this channel
over the one that alleviates credit constraints impinges negatively on welfare
inequality. Welfare-level eﬀects are also negative due to the crowding-out
eﬀect and to the disincentive tax-eﬀects on labor supply. Thus, welfare is
31also hump-shaped across debt-to-output ratios.
Concerning inter-temporal ﬁnancing, we ﬁnd that the optimal debt-to-
output level rises with the size of government (as measured by the expendi-
tures on output ratio) and, thus, implies larger inequality. Moreover, given
government expenditure, optimal combination of debt and social transfer
levels are smaller than the values observed, on average, in the EU countries,
during the last decades.
Finally, for a given level of public debt and government size, we assess
how (intra-temporal) composition of government spending impinges on both
welfare and inequality: (i) substituting unproductive spending by transfers
is welfare enhancing and improves disposable income inequality but only up
to a lower bound of unproductive spending, rather inelastic; (ii) substituting
unproductive by productive spending is always welfare enhancing and has no
impact on any inequality measure; and (iii), shifting transfers for productive
expenditure is always welfare enhancing for a suﬃciently high output elas-
ticity of public investment; if not, there is an optimal lower bound for social
transfers. Since productive expenditure has no direct eﬀects on inequality,
transfers reduction impacts negatively on disposable income inequality.
The present paper relies only on steady state analysis, i.e., we do not
account for a transition period, with welfare and related consequences in in-
equality in-between steady-states (for instance, during consolidation strate-
gies). A second limitation is that the model also uses a closed economy,
isolated from any foreign inﬂuence. We believe that the inclusion of more
than one country, eventually with diﬀerent-size countries, will bring more ro-
bustness to our results and also new insights. Finally, the absence of sovereign
32risk is also a simpliﬁcation hypothesis which can overestimate optimal public
debt levels.
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37TABLES
d tr gu gp
Wealth Gini Ø Ú Ø =
Income Gini Ø Ø Ø =
Consumption Gini Ø Ø Ø =
Leisure Gini Ú Ø Ú =
Welfare inequality Ú Ø Ø =
Table 1: Inequality eﬀect of ﬁscal policy variables.
38ϑ = 0.1 ϑ = 0.0
gu+gp 0.15 0.175 0.20 0.15 0.175 0.20
d 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.40 0.50
tr 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.08
τ 0.2289 0.2624 0.2968 0.3200 0.3417 0.3742
r 0.0124 0.0139 0.0159 0.0178 0.0192 0.0211
WG 0.4814 0.4766 0.4697 0.4847 0.4768 0.4724
IG 0.3178 0.3165 0.3147 0.2811 0.2837 0.2814
CG 0.1471 0.1455 0.1431 0.1327 0.1321 0.1304
LG 0.0417 0.0422 0.0428 0.0412 0.0418 0.0421
wu 0.0000 -0.0129 -0.0340 0.0000 -0.0409 -0.0814
wlevel 0.0000 -0.0225 -0.0560 0.0000 -0.0449 -0.0981
wunc 0.0000 +0.0017 +0.0041 0.0000 +0.0010 +0.0025
wine 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0017 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0018
Table 2: The optimal combination of debt, transfers and government expen-
diture for baseline calibration (ϑ = 0.1) and for the alternative calibration
(ϑ = 0.0).
Notes: WG = Wealth Gini index - IG = Income Gini index - CG = Con-
sumption Gini index - LG = Leisure Gini index.
39gu tr wu WG IG CG LG wine
0.2350 0.0000 0.0000 0.4574 0.3238 0.1440 0.0440 0.0000
0.2100 0.0250 0.0342 0.4635 0.3100 0.1399 0.0433 0.0021
0.1850 0.0500 0.0617 0.4690 0.2974 0.1361 0.0426 0.0038
0.1600 0.0750 0.0812 0.4740 0.2859 0.1324 0.0419 0.0053
0.1350 0.1000 0.0904 0.4786 0.2753 0.1289 0.0413 0.0066
0.1100 0.1250 0.0857 0.4829 0.2655 0.1256 0.0407 0.0077
0.0850 0.1500 0.0608 0.4868 0.2564 0.1224 0.0401 0.0086
0.0600 0.1750 0.0028 0.4904 0.2479 0.1193 0.0396 0.0092
0.0350 0.2000 -0.1212 0.4938 0.2400 0.1163 0.0390 0.0097
Table 3: Unproductive expenditure versus social transfers (G = 25%).
40G = 0.30 G = 0.25 G = 0.20
gp 0.0150 0.0150 0.0150
tr 0.1500 0.1050 0.0600
gu 0.1350 0.1300 0.1250
τ 0.3981 0.3365 0.2732
r 0.0234 0.0197 0.0164
WG 0.4831 0.4795 0.4754
IG 0.2513 0.2732 0.2953
CG 0.1198 0.1282 0.1362
LG 0.0407 0.0412 0.0413
wu 0.0000 0.0606 0.1148
wlevel 0.0000 0.1663 0.3438
wins 0.0000 -0.0043 -0.0093
wiine 0.0000 -0.0041 -0.0098
Table 4: Optimal unproductive expenditure and social transfer combination
across government sizes.
41gp tr wu WG IG CG LG wine
0.0050 0.1450 0.0000 0.4823 0.2531 0.1204 0.0408 0.0000
0.0100 0.1400 0.8668 0.4815 0.2550 0.1211 0.0409 -0.0003
0.0150 0.1350 1.7324 0.4806 0.2569 0.1218 0.0410 -0.0006
0.0200 0.1300 2.6115 0.4798 0.2588 0.1224 0.0411 -0.0009
0.0250 0.1250 3.5093 0.4789 0.2607 0.1231 0.0412 -0.0011
0.0300 0.1200 4.4280 0.4781 0.2627 0.1238 0.0413 -0.0014
0.0350 0.1150 5.3684 0.4772 0.2647 0.1244 0.0414 -0.0018
0.0400 0.1100 6.3310 0.4763 0.2667 0.1251 0.0416 -0.0021
0.0450 0.1050 7.3156 0.4754 0.2688 0.1258 0.0417 -0.0024
0.0500 0.1000 8.3222 0.4745 0.2709 0.1265 0.0418 -0.0027
Table 5: Productive expenditure versus social transfers: G = 30% and η =
0.3.
42G = 0.30 G = 0.25 G = 0.20
gp 0.0350 0.0330 0.0310
tr 0.1150 0.0670 0.0190
gu 0.1500 0.1500 0.1500
τ 0.3985 0.3369 0.2736
r 0.0229 0.0191 0.0157
WG 0.4772 0.4725 0.4670
IG 0.2647 0.2894 0.3148
CG 0.1244 0.1336 0.1424
LG 0.0414 0.0421 0.0426
wu 0.0000 0.0135 0.0201
wlevel 0.0000 0.0770 0.1502
wins 0.0000 -0.0050 -0.0109
wiine 0.0000 -0.0040 -0.0088
Table 6: Optimal productive expenditure and social transfer combination
across government-sizes (η = 0.03).
gu gp wu WG IG CG LG wine
0.1100 0.0150 0.0000 0.4781 0.2887 0.1340 0.0408 0.0000
0.1050 0.0200 0.2883 0.4781 0.2887 0.1340 0.0408 0.0000
0.1000 0.0250 0.5699 0.4781 0.2887 0.1340 0.0408 0.0000
0.0950 0.0300 0.8456 0.4781 0.2887 0.1340 0.0408 0.0000
0.0900 0.0350 1.1151 0.4781 0.2887 0.1340 0.0408 0.0000
Table 7: Unproductive versus productive expenditure (G = 20%).
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Figure 2: Gini indexes across debt-to-output ratios.
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Figure 3: Welfare decomposition across transfer-to-output ratios.
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Figure 4: Gini indexes across transfer-to-output ratios.


























Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 5: Welfare decomposition across unproductive government expendi-
ture: gu.
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Figure 6: Gini indexes across unproductive government expenditure: gu.
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Figure 7: Labour supply (vertical axis) against wealth (horizontal axis).
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Figure 8: Welfare decomposition when social transfers substitute for unpro-
ductive expenditure (G = 25%).



























Student Version of MATLAB
(a) η = 0.3
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(b) η = 0.03
Figure 9: Welfare decomposition when gp substitute for social transfers (G =
30%).
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Figure 10: Welfare decomposition when productive expenditure substitutes
unproductive expenditure (G = 20%).
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